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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE’S AUTOMATIC STAY: 
THEORY VS. PRACTICE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
ne does not normally have any positive associations with filing 
for bankruptcy—and for good reason. After all, being bankrupt 
means lacking sufficient funds to pay debts, manage expenses, run a 
functioning business, or otherwise meet financial obligations;1 clearly, 
then, this predicament is neither comfortable nor enjoyable. However, 
the bright side of filing for bankruptcy in the United States⎯if it can be 
thought of as such⎯is that the U.S. justice system affords many rights 
and protections to debtors so that they do not have to face the perils of 
bankruptcy unaided. One such protection is the automatic stay provided 
for by § 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.2 Whenever a debtor 
files for bankruptcy, an estate consisting of all the debtor’s property is 
                                                                                                             
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 59–60 (2d pocket ed. 2001). 
 2. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2005). This section states that:  
[A] petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . operates as a 
stay, applicable to all entities, of—(1) the commencement or continuation, in-
cluding the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or 
other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been 
commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover 
a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case un-
der this title; (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the 
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this 
title; (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; (4) any act to 
create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; (5) any act to 
create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent 
that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case 
under this title; (6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (7) the 
setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of 
the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and (8) the com-
mencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court 
concerning a corporate debtor’s tax liability for a taxable period the bankruptcy 
court may determine or concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an indi-
vidual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under 
this title.  
Id. 
O 
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created.3 The automatic stay then operates to protect this property by 
prohibiting anyone from making a claim against the property in the es-
tate.4 Put simply, once a debtor properly files for bankruptcy in a U.S. 
court, no creditor may initiate or continue a suit seeking to acquire any of 
the debtor’s assets.5 
At first blush, the automatic stay seems like the perfect protection 
mechanism for any given debtor; if a creditor acts to seize or lay claim to 
the assets of an individual who has filed a bankruptcy petition, the court 
can hold the creditor in violation of the automatic stay and declare the 
creditor’s actions void. However, while the automatic stay may operate 
flawlessly in theory, various problems can and do arise in its practical 
application. For example, what happens if a debtor owns property or as-
sets that lie outside the boundaries of the United States? The language of 
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) does indicate that the debtor’s estate is comprised of 
all of the debtor’s property, “wherever located.”6 Moreover, similar lan-
guage is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e).7 This statute, combined with 28 
U.S.C. § 157(a),8 operates to give the bankruptcy court, through the dis-
trict court in which the case is proceeding, “exclusive jurisdiction . . . 
[over] all of the property, wherever located . . . .”9 The plain meaning of 
this language would seem to imply that “wherever located” means 
“wherever in the world,” but does it in actuality? Realistically, can it? 
What if the property in question is located in a foreign country such that 
it lies outside of the U.S. court’s in rem jurisdiction? Can the U.S. court 
still, in fact, control the property? Alternatively, what if the creditor mak-
                                                                                                             
 3. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005). 
 4. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2005). The exceptions to this rule are enumerated in 11 
U.S.C. § 362(b) (2005). 
 5. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2005). 
 6. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005). 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005). This section states that: 
the district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction-- 
(1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the com-
mencement of such case, and of property of the estate; and 
(2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construction of 
section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules relating to disclo-
sure requirements under section 327. 
Id. 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2005) (Each district court may provide that any or all cases 
under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a 
case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005) (emphasis added). 
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ing a claim on a debtor’s property is a foreign entity such that the U.S. 
court lacks in personam jurisdiction? Without in personam jurisdiction, 
how can a U.S. court take actions against a creditor who violates the 
automatic stay? Worse still, what if a foreign court makes a ruling that 
operates to seize or compromise the property in question? How then 
could a U.S. court possibly declare such a ruling or action void? 
This Note will examine the extraterritorial application of the automatic 
stay—both in theory and in practice. Specifically, it will discuss and ana-
lyze the problems of holding that the automatic stay applies extraterrito-
rially in all situations, especially if the courts continue to hold that all 
acts which violate the automatic stay are void. While the rule that the 
automatic stay applies extraterritorially operates nicely in theory, the 
practical applications of such a holding have proven problematic, at least 
insofar as U.S. courts hold that extraterritorial violations of the automatic 
stay are void.10 Looking forward, this Note will suggest that the United 
States should explore the possibility of pursuing an international conven-
tion with other countries that also have stay provisions in their insol-
vency codes.11 
Part I of this Note sets forth background information regarding the 
automatic stay and its extraterritorial application. Part II examines the 
practical problems that arise from holding that the automatic stay applies 
extraterritorially in all situations. Part III then discusses principles of in-
ternational comity and questions of deference. Part IV goes on to exam-
ine stay provisions in foreign jurisdictions. Part V evaluates various as-
pects of both the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency and the 
European Community Insolvency Regulation (“EC Regulation”). Finally, 
Part VI compares the benefits and drawbacks of the two systems de-
scribed in Part V and concludes that the best course of action for the 
                                                                                                             
 10. See Sinatra v. Gucci (In re Gucci), 309 B.R. 679, 683 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
stating that: 
The fact that Congress granted the district courts . . . power to enter orders af-
fecting assets of the debtor, wherever located, does not preclude foreign courts 
from exercising jurisdiction over estate property located in their countries, a 
matter that raises such questions as to the extraterritorial effect of the automatic 
stay and the personal jurisdiction of the United States courts over the entity at 
whose behest the foreign court acts.  
Id. 
 11. While the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the insolvency codes of many other coun-
tries provide for an automatic stay, some other countries’ insolvency codes only allow for 
non-automatic stays—stays that are entered after a given action occurs, at the request of 
one of the parties, or at the discretion of the presiding court. See infra Part IV.A. 
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United States to undertake would be to pursue a convention similar to the 
EC Regulation. 
I. THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
Whenever an individual or other entity files a bankruptcy petition un-
der Title 11 of the Untied States Code, an estate is created that embodies 
all of the debtor’s property, “wherever located and by whomever held.”12 
Additionally, the filing of such a petition triggers an automatic stay that 
prohibits any individual or entity from commencing or continuing any 
action or proceeding against the debtor.13 In effect, the automatic stay 
seals the debtor’s estate14 such that all of the debtor’s assets are protected 
from creditors for the duration of the stay. 
The automatic stay has several functions, one of which is to protect the 
debtor during his or her bankruptcy proceedings.15 Primarily, the auto-
matic stay serves to “prevent the debtor’s estate from being picked to 
pieces by creditors”16 so that the bankruptcy court can distribute the 
debtor’s assets in a fair and equitable manner.17 The interests of the 
debtor are best served if all matters related to the bankruptcy are si-
phoned into one proceeding, thus avoiding a “chaotic and uncontrolled 
scramble for the debtor’s assets in a variety of uncoordinated proceed-
ings in different courts.”18 Additionally, the automatic stay works to pro-
tect the estate and preserve it for the creditors’ benefit19 so that creditors 
are not forced to compete in a race to the courthouse, with the winner 
taking home the bulk of the assets. Finally, the automatic stay also 
“serves to protect and preserve the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court so 
that the court can administer the debtor’s estate in an orderly fashion.”20 
The first court to consider the question of whether the automatic stay 
applies extraterritorially was a bankruptcy court in the Southern District 
                                                                                                             
 12. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005). 
 13. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2005). 
 14. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005). 
 15. Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 16. Underwood v. Hillard (In re Rimsat), 98 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Martin-Trigona v. Champion Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 
1989)). 
 17. GMAM v. Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (In re Globo Comunicacoes 
E Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 18. In re Rimsat, 98 F.3d at 961 (quoting In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 
1982)); see also In re Falls Bldg., Ltd., 94 B.R. 471, 480–81 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988). 
 19. In re Nakash, 190 B.R. at 768. 
 20. Id. 
2007]  EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 281 
of New York.21 There, the McLean22 court held that the automatic stay 
does indeed apply extraterritorially such that foreign entities, in addition 
to domestic entities, are bound by the language of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).23 
Since 1987, United States courts have uniformly upheld the extraterrito-
rial application of the automatic stay.24 This trend, however, marks a de-
parture from the general presumption that United States statutes do not 
apply outside the boundaries of the United States without express con-
gressional intent.25 In E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (“Aramco”), 
Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated the “long-standing presumption 
against extraterritoriality and validated it as a means by which to effectu-
ate the unexpressed congressional intent that its laws are designed first 
and foremost to address domestic conditions.”26 Rehnquist upheld the 
importance of this presumption as a means to prevent U.S. law from in-
advertently clashing with laws of other nations, thus avoiding “interna-
tional discord.”27 In deciding Aramco, Rehnquist reasoned that courts 
                                                                                                             
 21. In re McLean Industries, 74 B.R. 589 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). It is surprising that 
this question never arose until 1987, but that is apparently the earliest discussion of this 
problem. Additionally, since the McLean court does not cite to previous authority for the 
proposition that the automatic stay applies extraterritorially, it seems likely that this was 
indeed an issue of first impression in 1987. 
 22. Id. The debtor, a U.S. entity, owned twelve Econoships used to transport goods 
internationally. When the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition, eight of the Econoships were 
returned to the United States, but four were arrested overseas in Singapore and Hong 
Kong. Courts of those countries issued arrest warrants for the vessels notwithstanding the 
automatic stay. Id. at 590–94. 
 23. Id. at 601 (citing In re McLean Industries, Inc, 68 B.R. 690, 694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1986)). 
 24. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 
996 (9th Cir. 1998); Underwood v. Hillard (In re Rimsat), 98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 
1996); In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 406 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); Sinatra v. Gucci 
(In re Gucci), 309 B.R. 679, 683–84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Artimm, 278 B.R. 
832, 841 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002); Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 
638, 657–58 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., v. Hanseatic Ma-
rine Service (In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.), 207 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1997); Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 25. David M. Green and Walter Benzija, Spanning the Globe: The Intended Extrater-
ritorial Reach of the Bankruptcy Code, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 85 (2002) (cit-
ing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros., Inc. v. 
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 
347 (1909)). 
 26. Green, supra note 25, at 88 (citing Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248). 
In Aramco, a U.S. citizen (Boureslan) was working for a U.S. corporation, Arabian 
American Oil Co. (“Aramco”) in Saudi Arabia. Boureslan was fired and he sued in the 
United States under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964. The question then arose as 
to whether this statute, and U.S. statutes in general, apply extraterritorially. 
 27. Id. (quoting Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248). 
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must assume that Congress legislates “against the backdrop of the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality,” and set forth the rule that laws apply 
domestically unless Congress made a clear affirmative expression to the 
contrary.28 That being established, this Note will now explore the lan-
guage of the automatic stay provision that portrays Congress’s intent that 
the provision apply extraterritorially. 
Beginning more broadly, some have argued that Congress intended 
that the entire Bankruptcy Code have extraterritorial reach.29 The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, adopted this view in HSBC v. Simon (In re Simon) 
and held there that the bankruptcy discharge operated extraterritorially.30 
One of the major factors that contributed to this holding is the specific 
language of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). This statute states that when a debtor 
files a petition for bankruptcy under Title 11, an estate is created com-
posed of all of the debtor’s property, “wherever located and by whom-
ever held.”31 The Simon court found this language to be a clear expres-
sion of Congress’s intent that the Code should apply extraterritorially.32 
Moreover, it seems necessary that the Bankruptcy Code should have ex-
traterritorial reach in order to “effectuate its principle goals of asset pres-
ervation” and ensure fair distribution of the debtor’s property.33 Espe-
cially in today’s global marketplace, it defies logic that Congress in-
tended strict guidelines and fair distribution of assets when U.S. entities 
were involved, but that these rules and guidelines should evaporate as 
soon as foreign entities come into the picture. 
That Congress intended the automatic stay to apply extraterritorially is 
even more apparent. The language of the automatic stay provision itself 
demands that no entity commence or continue any action seeking to ac-
quire property from the debtor,34 and 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) puts all of the 
debtor’s property35 under the control of the district court in which the 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. (quoting Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248). 
 29. Id. at 92 (“The language, structure and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code 
all suggest that Congress fully intended for it to have extraterritorial application.”). 
 30. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 
996 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Congress clearly intended the extraterritorial application of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”). Here, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 and received a discharge order. 
Afterwards, a foreign creditor who participated in the Chapter 7 proceeding sought to 
collect on the discharged debt outside of the United States. The question arose as to 
whether a U.S. Bankruptcy Court could sanction the foreign creditor, and the court held 
that the discharge operated extraterritorially. Id. 
 31. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 32. 153 F.3d at 996. 
 33. Green, supra note 25, at 93. 
 34. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2005). 
 35. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) created an estate comprised of all of the debtor’s property. 
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case is proceeding.36 This control is then passed to the bankruptcy court 
through 11 U.S.C. § 157(a).37 The report from the House of Representa-
tives that accompanied the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 “states that 
the intent of the statute was to ensure that ‘[t]he bankruptcy court is 
given in personam jurisdiction as well as in rem jurisdiction to handle 
everything that arises in a bankruptcy case.’”38 The language of 28 
U.S.C. § 1334 and 11 U.S.C. § 541, viewed in light of their relationships 
to the automatic stay provision and coupled with the House report, seem 
to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality and satisfy the stan-
dard set down by the Supreme Court in Aramco.39 However, even though 
many courts have held that the automatic stay applies extraterritorially, 
practical enforcement of the extraterritorial application has proven diffi-
cult. The next section will examine some decisions that have dealt with 
such problems. 
II. PROBLEMS WITH HOLDING THAT THE AUTOMATIC STAY APPLIES 
EXTRATERRITORIALLY 
In domestic bankruptcy disputes, the case law is clear that “the auto-
matic stay ‘is effective immediately upon the filing of the petition, and 
any proceedings or actions described in section 362(a)(1) are void and 
without vitality if they occur after the automatic stay takes effect.’”40 If 
actions that violate the automatic stay are void and the automatic stay 
applies extraterritorially, logic dictates that extraterritorial actions that 
violate the automatic stay are likewise void. However, while many courts 
have held that the automatic stay applies extraterritorially,41 the practical 
reality is that the extraterritorial effect of the automatic stay may depend 
on whether a U.S. court has in personam jurisdiction over the violators or 
                                                                                                             
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005). 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2005). Since 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) specifically gives the dis-
trict court jurisdiction over the debtor’s estate, the bankruptcy court would have no juris-
diction over the debtor’s assets without 28 U.S.C. § 157. Because section 157 passes 
jurisdiction of the debtor’s estate to the bankruptcy court in the district in which the dis-
trict court sits, the bankruptcy court is able to administer the debtor’s estate. 
 38. GMAM v. Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (In re Globo Comunicacoes 
E Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 
95-595 at 445 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6400) (alteration in origi-
nal). 
 39. 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 40. Eastern Refractories Co. Inc. v. Forty Eight Insulators Inc., 157 F.3d 169, 172 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (quoting Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 
1994)). 
 41. See supra note 24. 
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whether a foreign court will choose to enforce the U.S. court’s orders.42 
As a court must first tackle jurisdictional issues before delving into the 
merits of a claim, an analysis of those jurisdictional issues which are 
prevalent in automatic stay cases follows below. 
In order for a bankruptcy court to adjudicate a dispute, it (like any 
other court) must have appropriate jurisdiction. Specifically for cases 
involving the automatic stay, a court must have in personam jurisdiction 
over relevant parties and in rem jurisdiction over the property or assets in 
question. While 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) confers upon a bankruptcy court in 
rem jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s property “wherever located,”43 
this exercise of custody “creates a fiction that the property—regardless of 
its actual location—is legally located within the jurisdictional boundaries 
of the district court in which the court sits.”44 Here, it seems that the 
Ninth Circuit hit the nail on the head: exercising in rem jurisdiction 
through 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) creates only a fiction that the bankruptcy 
court can control the debtor’s property if that property lies outside the 
territorial boundaries of the United States. In actuality, the courts of the 
country in which the property is physically located are the only entities 
that can determine what will happen to that property.45 Moreover, if for-
eign creditors violate the automatic stay, U.S. bankruptcy courts cannot 
protect the debtor’s assets unless the courts can exercise in personam 
jurisdiction over the violating entities.46 This has often caused courts to 
“[strain] to find a basis for personal jurisdiction over foreign actors by 
relying on the legal fiction of in rem jurisdiction.”47 Because of this 
straining, courts that technically have in personam jurisdiction over of-
fending foreign creditors may nonetheless find their sanctions or orders 
                                                                                                             
 42. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Gucci (In re Gucci), 309 B.R. 679, 684 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“As the property in question here is located in Rome, its fate ultimately will be 
determined by Italian courts, which will give such weight as they think appropriate to the 
decision below.”); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., v. Hanseatic Marine Service (In re 
Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.), 207 B.R. 282, 288 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (ordering 
sanctions and rulings against Hanseatic without a realistic enforcement mechanism); 
Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 771 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that 
the Israeli receiver violated the stay but refusing to impose sanctions at the time of the 
decision). 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005). 
 44. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 
996 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966)). 
 45. In re Gucci, 309 B.R. at 683–84. 
 46. Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 655 (Bankr. D. Md. 
1998) (“[I]n personam jurisdiction is required before the court may restrain a defendant 
from interfering with that property.”). 
 47. Green, supra note 25, at 109 (alteration added). 
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useless in preventing the foreign creditors from continuing to violate the 
automatic stay. An examination of cases that exemplify these issues fol-
lows below. 
A. Exercising In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Entities 
As stated above, when faced with the difficult question of whether the 
automatic stay applies extraterritorially, U.S. bankruptcy courts have 
been in complete agreement in answering affirmatively.48 Moreover, 
when foreign entities violate the automatic stay by interfering with the 
debtor’s property after a U.S. bankruptcy petition has been filed, U.S. 
bankruptcy courts have consistently held that they have in personam ju-
risdiction over the violator.49 This holding is necessary because without 
in personam jurisdiction, the U.S. court would be unable to enforce its 
holding or in any way hold the violator accountable.50 However, the case 
law has made it quite clear that even if a bankruptcy court asserts in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the foreign entity, it may nevertheless be unable 
to prevent that entity from interfering with the debtor’s property without 
assistance from a foreign court. Examples of this phenomenon follow 
below. 
1. In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. 
Lykes, an international shipping company, filed a Chapter 11 petition 
in October of 1995.51 Prior to the petition date, Lykes charted two vessels 
from non-U.S. companies: the M/V Altonia from Altonia Schiffahrtsge-
sellschaft mbh & Co. and the M/V Arabella from the Andrea Shipping 
(PTH) Ltd.52 Lykes returned both ships to their respective owners before 
filing its bankruptcy petition, but both Altonia and Andrea claimed that 
Lykes owed them money based on pre-petition breaches of the charters.53 
                                                                                                             
 48. See supra note 24. 
 49. GMAM v. Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (In re Globo Comunicacoes 
E Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 252 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004); Lykes Bros. Steamship 
Co., Inc., v. Hanseatic Marine Service (In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.), 207 B.R. 
282, 285 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 767 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 50. In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. at 655 (“But even though the court may have in rem 
jurisdiction over the debtor’s property, in personam jurisdiction is required before the 
court may restrain a defendant from interfering with that property.”). 
 51. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 284. 
 52. Id. The text of the decision makes it clear that the M/V Arabella was chartered 
from a Singapore company, but it does not state from which country the M/V Altonia 
came. 
 53. Id. Altonia claimed that Lykes owes it approximately $130,000 and Andrea 
claimed that Lykes owes it about $30,000. Id. 
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Five days after Lykes had filed its Chapter 11 petition, Andrea and Alto-
nia assigned their claims against Lykes to a German company called 
Hanseatic Marine Service GmbH; this action was held to violate the 
automatic stay.54 About five months later, in March of 1997, Hanseatic 
truly broke the peace by procuring the arrest of another of Lykes’ ships, 
the M/V Stella Lykes, in a court in Belgium “in order to compel payment 
of the pre-petition claims purportedly assigned by Andrea and Altonia.”55 
The Lykes court properly began its analysis with a discussion as to 
whether it could exercise in personam jurisdiction over the various de-
fendants.56 The court dispensed with Andrea very quickly, asserting that 
it “[c]learly . . . has personal jurisdiction over Andrea Shipping because 
Andrea filed a claim . . . and has therefore consented to the jurisdiction 
of the United States Bankruptcy Court.”57 While the case law may be 
clear on this point, the court still found it difficult to require Andrea to 
act according to the court’s direction.58 Because Andrea was not a U.S.-
based entity, the U.S. court was limited with regard to the sanctions it 
could realistically enforce against Andrea.59 Any sanctions that the court 
did impose would only be effective if Andrea had assets physically lo-
cated in the United States—otherwise, Andrea (absent a court order from 
its country of incorporation) would have no incentive to submit to sanc-
tions of a U.S. court.60 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. at 284–85. While the assignment of claims normally does not violate the 
automatic stay, the court found that Hanseatic was created for the sole purpose of avoid-
ing the automatic stay seeing as it was actually created five days after the assignments 
were made. Therefore, the court held that this particular assignment did violate the stay. 
 55. Id. at 285. 
 56. Id. 
 57. If an individual files a claim in or invokes the aid/protection of a U.S. bankruptcy 
court, that individual has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and 
must therefore abide by the consequences of the related bankruptcy proceedings. In re 
Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 285–86 (citing Langenkamp v. Kulp, 498 U.S. 42, 111 S.Ct. 
330, 112 L.Ed.2d 343 (1990)); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966); Gardner v. 
New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947); In re Schwinn Bicycle Co., 182 B.R. 526, 530 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995); In re Am. Exp. Group Int’l. Serv., Inc., 167 B.R. 311, 316 
(Bankr. D.Colo 1994). 
 58. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 286 (“Having voluntarily filed its proof of claim in 
this reorganization case, Andrea purposefully submitted itself to this Court’s jurisdiction 
and was obligated to comply with its orders and with its procedures. Neither it nor its 
purported transferee did so.”). 
 59. See Container Leasing International, LLC v. Navicon, S.A., No. 
CIV303CV00101, 2006 WL 861012 at *7 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2006); Global Marine 
Shipping (No. 10) Ltd. v. Finning Intern, Inc., No. CIV.A.101–1901, 2002 WL 126932 at 
*5 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2002). 
 60. See Container Leasing International, 2006 WL 861012 at *7; Global Marine 
Shipping, 2002 WL 126932 at *5. 
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The Lykes court found that it had in personam jurisdiction over Altonia 
as well, but for a different reason.61 Here, the court relied on a minimum 
contacts analysis.62 This analysis is more compelling than the analysis 
regarding Andrea,63 but Altonia could also have chosen to disregard any 
orders made by this court unless Altonia owned assets that were physi-
cally located in the United States.64 If Altonia owned no assets in the 
United States and decided it no longer needed the benefits of dealing 
with the United States courts, why would it accept sanctions? 
The most troubling part of this opinion is the single sentence that this 
court devoted to establishing its in personam jurisdiction over Han-
seatic.65 Here, the court stated, “[w]hile nothing in the record warrants 
the conclusion that Haneastic is subject to the personal jurisdiction of 
this Court, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1334(d) grants this Court jurisdiction over all property of the 
estate wheresoever located.”66 In making this assertion, the court “ac-
knowledged that there was no traditional basis upon which to base per-
sonal jurisdiction over [Hanseatic], ultimately relying on [Hanseatic’s] 
continuing knowledge that its actions . . . would have the effect of dis-
rupting the debtor’s U.S. bankruptcy case and its property.”67 Based on 
this precariously justified assertion of in personam jurisdiction, the bank-
ruptcy court went on to order that Hanseatic be enjoined from taking fur-
ther steps to collect any assets from the debtor and that Haneastic must 
                                                                                                             
 61. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 286. 
 62. Id. at 286–87. Here, the court discussed eight points from the record to demon-
strate that Altonia did indeed have minimum contacts with the United States. Those 
points include the facts that Altonia: 1) entered into a charter with Lykes; 2) agreed to 
deliver the vessel to Lykes in New York; 3) agreed to accept re-delivery of the vessel in 
New York; 4) allowed the chartered vessel to call on ports in the United States; 5) agreed 
in the charter that all bills of lading issued under the charter be subject to the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act of the United States; 6) agreeing that Altonia would be bound by the 
U.S. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; 7) entered into a Certificate of Financial Responsibil-
ity with the United States Coast Guard, and; 8) agreed that Altonia would remain respon-
sible for the navigation of the vessel, knowing that it would call on United States ports. 
 63. The reasoning with regard to Altonia is more compelling because the court had 
jurisdiction over Altonia independent of the instant bankruptcy proceedings—this seems 
more legitimate the “jurisdiction by ambush” to which Andrea was subject. 
 64. See Container Leasing International, 2006 WL 861012 at *7; Global Marine 
Shipping, 2002 WL 126932 at *5. 
 65. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 287. 
 66. Id. Note that here the court cited to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) for the “wherever lo-
cated” provision, but 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) currently holds this language. In fact, § 1334(d) 
did contain the “wherever located” provision until the code was amended in 1994. This 
provision appears in § 1334(e) today. 
 67. Green, supra note 25, at 109 (alterations added). 
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immediately drop any open actions against the debtor anywhere in the 
world.68 
How can this be? Under what set of bizarre and improbable circum-
stances would Hanseatic actually submit to the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court and decide to follow its orders? At least Andrea and Altonia 
are companies that had previously had dealings with the United States, 
either through voluntary court proceedings or minimum contacts in busi-
ness transactions.69 Because of these previous dealings, it is conceiv-
able—if not probable—that these companies had assets in the United 
States and would therefore have agreed to comply with orders of the 
bankruptcy court.70 Hanseatic, however, is a completely different story. 
If the Lykes court was right—and it seems that it was—Hanseatic was 
created solely for the purpose of contravening the automatic stay and 
pursuing the debtor’s assets despite the previously filed Chapter 11 peti-
tion.71 Essentially, Hanseatic was only subject to the personal jurisdiction 
of the Lykes court because Hanseatic was in possession of Lykes’s ves-
sel, as provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e).72 Only by relying on the fic-
tion that the bankruptcy court can exercise in rem jurisdiction over the 
property,73 and by straining this fiction to an extreme degree in order to 
exercise in personam jurisdiction over the violator,74 could the bank-
ruptcy court claim that it had the proper jurisdiction to issue orders to 
Hanseatic. This reasoning is dubious at best. 
2. In re Nakash 
Joseph Nakash was a member of the board of directors of an Israeli 
banking institution called The North American Bank, Ltd.75 The institu-
tion was declared insolvent, and Nakash filed a voluntary petition under 
Chapter 11 in the United States in October 1994. He filed this petition in 
response to a $160 million judgment entered against him in Israel in De-
cember 1993.76 In order to enforce the judgment, the Official Receiver of 
the State of Israel (the “receiver”) commenced an action in the Eastern 
                                                                                                             
 68. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 288. 
 69. Id. at 285–87. 
 70. See Container Leasing International, 2006 WL 861012 at *7; Global Marine 
Shipping, 2002 WL 126932 at *5. 
 71. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 285. 
 72. Id. at 287. 
 73. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 
996 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966)). 
 74. Green, supra note 25, at 109. 
 75. Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 766 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 76. Id. 
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District of New York, seeking an order of attachment.77 The district court 
granted the order.78 Then, on January 16, 1995, the receiver filed an in-
voluntary petition in Israel against Nakash.79 Nakash responded by filing 
an adversary proceeding, claiming that the receiver had violated the 
automatic stay by filing the involuntary petition in Israel.80 
Like the Lykes court, this court began with a discussion of jurisdic-
tion.81 And, as in Lykes, the bankruptcy court quickly established that it 
had in personam jurisdiction over the receiver because the receiver had 
“submitted himself to the courts of the United States, including this 
court, by, inter alia, seeking attachment in the Eastern District of New 
York . . . .”82 This exercise of jurisdiction is similar to that which the Ly-
kes court exercised over Andrea, but with one important distinction: An-
drea was a foreign company whereas the receiver was an agent of a for-
eign government.83 
This raises the question of whether a bankruptcy court can sanction an 
agent of a foreign government.84 It seems clear that with Andrea, the 
U.S. court could have been able to lay some sanctions on its own, but 
with the receiver, the U.S. court is powerless to enforce any punishment 
at all (short of physically apprehending the receiver) without the assis-
tance and approval of the Israeli government.85 Here, the differences be-
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. at 767. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. This was the second involuntary petition that the receiver filed against Nakash 
in Israel. The first was in January 1993, but the Israeli court dismissed that proceeding. 
The receiver appealed and the Supreme Court of Israel reversed and remanded, but no 
hearing date was set. Id. at 766–67. 
 80. In re Nakash, 190 B.R. at 767. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 767–78 (citing Fotochrome, Inc v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 
1975)); See also In re Deak & Co., Inc., 63 B.R. 422, 433 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). The 
Nakash court also sought to strengthen its assertion by stating that in the process of seek-
ing the attachment, the receiver appeared through New York counsel, filed pleadings, 
filed a proof of claim, and participated in a discovery exchange program. 
 83. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., v. Hanseatic Marine Service (In re Lykes Bros. 
Steamship Co., Inc.), 207 B.R. 282, 284 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); In re Nakash, 190 B.R. 
at 765. 
 84. While there are definitely Act of State and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
issues lurking here, a discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Note. This 
discussion assumes that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not bar jurisdiction 
and that the Act of State Doctrine does not prohibit the U.S. court from sitting in judg-
ment of the acts in question. 
 85. GMAM v. Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (In re Globo Comunicacoes 
E Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 250 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he bankruptcy 
court may not be able to secure compliance with such orders except to the degree that it 
may either assert personal jurisdiction . . . or obtain cooperation from courts in foreign 
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tween the theoretical and practical approaches to handling the extraterri-
torial application of the automatic stay are glaringly evident; holding that 
the stay applies extraterritorially works well in theory, but ensuring that 
such a holding is respected is another matter entirely. Especially in this 
case, it seems extremely unlikely that an Israeli court would have ap-
proved of sanctions against the receiver in light of the fact that the Jeru-
salem court endorsed a motion by the receiver in which he requested per-
mission from that court to file the 1995 involuntary petition notwith-
standing the Chapter 11 proceedings.86 While the Nakash court did find 
that the receiver violated the automatic stay, it could not declare the re-
ceiver’s actions void and chose to leave the issue of sanctions and dam-
ages for another time.87 This decision, unlike that of the Lykes court, 
avoided a scenario in which a U.S. court issues an order that it cannot 
effectively enforce. 
B. Exercising In Rem Jurisdiction Over Property Located Abroad 
As noted above, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) gives the district court—and ulti-
mately the associated bankruptcy court—jurisdiction over all of the 
debtor’s assets, “wherever located.”88 It is from this statute that U.S. 
courts derive the fiction that the debtor’s property sits within the reach of 
the court and thus the power to exercise in rem jurisdiction over that 
property.89 The major problem which emerges here is that this idea that 
28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) actually gives a U.S. court in rem jurisdiction is just 
what the In re Simon court said it is: a fiction.90 But what happens when 
a foreign court—a court in the country in which the debtor’s property 
actually sits—disagrees with the U.S. court and issues orders affecting 
the property? This was one major issue that surfaced in In re Gucci.91 
                                                                                                             
jurisdictions. . . . Furthermore, a foreign court might hypothetically issue conflicting or-
ders . . . pursuant to the foreign court’s own view of its jurisdiction . . . .”); Hobson v. 
Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 655 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998) (“[A] U.S. court 
order would be enforceable in another country (in the absence of a treaty or convention) 
only to the extent that the foreign courts” are compelled to enforce it.) (citing In re Mcta-
gue, 198 B.R. 428, 430 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
 86. In re Nakash, 190 B.R. at 767. 
 87. Id. at 771. 
 88. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2005). 
 89. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 
996 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966)). 
 90. Id. See also Green, supra note 25, at 98. 
 91. Sinatra v. Gucci (In re Gucci), 309 B.R. 679 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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1. In re Gucci 
Paolo Gucci, the debtor, owned a store in Rome, Italy.92 In February 
1994,93 he filed a Chapter 11 petition in the United States.94 A month 
later, his cousin, Maurizio, obtained an arbitration award against Paolo in 
Switzerland and registered a lien against the Rome property.95 Several 
years later, in May 2000, the trustee of Paolo’s estate filed suit against 
Maurizio’s estate alleging that Maurizio had violated the automatic stay 
by obtaining the Swiss award and registering the lien after Paolo had 
filed for Chapter 11.96 The bankruptcy court ruled for the trustee because 
“[t]he lien was registered pursuant to a decision of an Italian court after 
the automatic stay was in effect . . . .”97 Defendants appealed to the dis-
trict court on several grounds, one of which being that the automatic stay 
should not have been applied in this case.98 
In analyzing this issue, the district court followed the model that other 
courts dealing with the extraterritorial application of the automatic stay 
had set forth and thus began with a jurisdictional discussion.99 Like many 
courts have done before, this court cited 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)100 and 28 
U.S.C. § 157(a),101 emphasizing the “wherever located” language.102 The 
court then went on to proclaim that this case did not involve—contrary to 
the defendants’ assertions—a conflict between the bankruptcy court and 
                                                                                                             
 92. Id. at 681. 
 93. In re Gucci, No. 06-0496-bk, 2006 WL 2671970 at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 2006). 
This is an appellate decision that took place after the above-cited case (309 B.R. 679) was 
remanded and decided again by the district court. I cite to the appellate decision here 
because the above-cited case omitted background facts and the district court’s opinion on 
remand made an error as to the date of the Chapter 11 filing. That opinion stated that 
Paolo filed in February 2005, which cannot be correct. I believe February 1994 to be the 
correct date of the Chapter 11 filing as it makes sense in the timeline and because the 
courts that recount the background facts agree on all other dates. 
 94. The cases give no indication as to why Paolo Gucci, who owned property in 
Rome, filed Chapter 11 in the United States. One can only assume that he owned assets in 
the United States as well. 
 95. In re Gucci, No. 05-Civ-4444(DC), 2005 WL 3150709 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 
2005). 
 96. Id. at *2. 
 97. 309 B.R. at 681. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. The only discussion here was about in rem jurisdiction—because of the nature 
of the claim, a discussion of in personam jurisdiction was not necessary. Specifically, the 
court was only concerned with being able to exercise jurisdiction over the store in Rome 
(in rem), and not a person or other legal entity requiring in personam jurisdiction. Id. 
 100. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005). 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2005). 
 102. In re Gucci, 309 B.R. at 681–82. 
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the Italian court.103 Here, defendants claimed that by ruling for Gucci 
below, the bankruptcy court declared an act of the Italian court void ab 
initio.104 However, the district court disagreed; it stated that the bank-
ruptcy court declared void “the registration of the Italian judgment lien,” 
as a matter of U.S. law only.105 In other words, the only thing that the 
bankruptcy court declared void was the registration of this lien in the 
United States as it related to Gucci’s Chapter 11 case. The bankruptcy 
court—or any U.S. court for that matter—could not declare the judgment 
lien itself void because that lien was the result of an act of an Italian 
court.106 The court then went on to explain in greater detail: 
The Bankruptcy Court neither purported to alter, nor could have al-
tered, ownership interests in the Italian real estate in the same sense as 
in cases in which the property is within the physical power or territorial 
jurisdiction of an in rem court. The fact that Congress granted the dis-
trict courts, and via their referral, the bankruptcy courts power to enter 
orders affecting assets of the debtor, wherever located, does not pre-
clude foreign courts from exercising jurisdiction over estate property 
located in their countries, a matter that raises such questions as to the 
extraterritorial effect of the automatic stay and the personal jurisdiction 
of the Untied States courts over an entity at whose behest a foreign 
court acts.107 
Finally, the district court concluded that since “the property in question 
here is located in Rome, its fate will ultimately be determined by Italian 
courts, which will give such weight as they think appropriate to the deci-
sion below.”108 
This decision is extremely important because the court acknowledged 
and embraced the problem with holding that the automatic stay applies 
extraterritorially,109 unlike other courts, which simply held that the auto-
matic stay does apply across borders without citing the difficulties and 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id. at 683. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 683–84 (citing 1 KING, ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01[5], at 3-32 
to 3-33 (15th ed. rev. 2003)) (“[T]he extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States 
courts for these purposes is in personam rather than in rem. If a creditor causes property 
of a title 11 estate to be seized in a foreign country, that creditor has violated the auto-
matic stay. Whether that creditor can be punished, however, is a function of that credi-
tor’s amenability to the United States process. By the same token, a United States court 
cannot control the action of the foreign court irrespective of section 1334(e).”). 
 108. In re Gucci, 309 B.R. at 684. 
 109. Id. 
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consequences that invariably accompany such a holding.110 Once courts 
realize that the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over property located 
abroad truly is a fiction,111 and that a holding predicated on that fiction 
may prove futile,112 U.S. courts and legislatures may begin to think about 
what can be done to avoid this unfavorable situation. 
III. INTERNATIONAL COMITY AND THE QUESTION OF DEFERENCE 
Upon being sued for allegedly violating the automatic stay, foreign 
creditors often defend themselves by asserting that the automatic stay 
should not apply to them for reasons of international comity.113 The Su-
preme Court defined the term “comity” over a century ago, and that clas-
sic definition is still consistently cited today: 
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, 
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. 
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to 
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of 
its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws.114  
Under principles of comity, U.S. courts normally “refuse to review acts 
of foreign governments and defer to proceedings taking place in foreign 
countries, allowing those acts and proceedings to have extraterritorial 
effect in the United States.”115 However, comity is not a strict rule of 
law—rather, it is a rule of “practice, convenience and expediency.”116 
Therefore, in instances in which extending comity to a foreign entity 
would mandate a result contrary to U.S. policy, the U.S. court should 
decline the foreign entity’s request.117 According to the Second Circuit, 
U.S. courts are not obligated to extend comity if doing so would be con-
                                                                                                             
 110. See, e.g., Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1996); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. v. Hanseatic Marine Service (In re Lykes Bros. 
Steamship Co., Inc.), 207 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997). 
 111. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 
996 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 112. See In re Gucci, 309 B.R. at 683–84. See also Green, supra note 25 at 98. 
 113. See, e.g., Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 654–56 
(Bankr. D. Md. 1998); In re Nakash, 190 B.R. at 770. 
 114. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1895). 
 115. Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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trary to strong public policy.118 So the question then arises: should U.S. 
courts grant comity to foreign laws or proceedings if it means allowing a 
foreign entity to violate the automatic stay? 
A. In re Travelstead 
Mr. Travelstead (the debtor) and Ms. Hobson had acquired a Dutch 
corporation called Blockless in which Travelstead owned an eighty per-
cent interest and Hobson a twenty percent interest.119 In December 1995, 
the debtor borrowed AUS$4,900,000120 from Blockless (with Hobson’s 
consent), but then failed to repay the loans when they were due.121 In 
May 1996, Hobson sued the debtor in the Netherlands to compel repay-
ment, and a Dutch court ordered the debtor to repay immediately.122 In-
stead of repaying the loans, the debtor filed for Chapter 11 in the United 
States.123 Subsequently, Hobson petitioned the Dutch court to order the 
debtor to purchase all of her shares in Blockless, and the Dutch court 
complied.124 Travelstead then sued Hobson in the United States, alleging 
that her attempts to compel payment and her pursuit of the buyout order 
violated the automatic stay.125 In her defense, Hobson claimed that the 
U.S. court should abstain from hearing the case based on principles of 
international comity.126 
After an examination of U.S. case law setting forth the principles of in-
ternational comity, the court addressed Hobson’s claim that the debtor’s 
Chapter 11 reorganization plan conflicted with the Dutch order.127 Spe-
cifically, Hobson asserted that the Dutch order required that the debtor 
repay Blockless immediately and that the debtor buy Hobson’s shares at 
the same time that she tendered them.128 The plan, on the other hand, pro-
vided that the debtor repay Blockless within two years and that the 
                                                                                                             
 118. Id. (quoting Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 
937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 119. Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 642 (Bankr. D. Md. 
1998). 
 120. On December 1, 1995, AUS$4,900,000 amounted to USD$3,612,280. See 
http://www.jeico.co.kr/cnc57aus.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2007). 
 121. In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. at 642. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. The case does not specify why the debtor was able to file a U.S. Bankruptcy 
petition in this instance, but foreign debtors can file in the United States if they have a 
domicile in the United States or if they have assets located in the United States. 
 124. Id. at 643. 
 125. Id. 
 126. In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. at 654–58. 
 127. Id. at 656. 
 128. Id. 
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debtor could choose not to pay Hobson at the time she tendered her 
shares.129 Although the court recognized these differences, it ultimately 
decided that “the Plan defers to the Dutch Judgments far more than it 
conflicts with them,” because the claims themselves were preserved and 
determined under Dutch law.130 Therefore, the court determined that it 
was not proper or necessary to abstain from hearing the debtor’s case 
based on considerations of international comity.131 
B. In re Nakash 
The Israeli receiver, who filed an involuntary bankruptcy case against 
Nakash (the debtor) in Israel after the debtor filed for Chapter 11 in the 
United States,132 defended his case by asserting that even if the automatic 
stay applied extraterritorially, principles of international comity required 
that the U.S. court find that the he did not violate the automatic stay.133 
Specifically, the receiver asserted that subjecting him to the automatic 
stay would create a direct conflict between American and Israeli law.134 
The court, however, chose to focus on the acts of the receiver himself 
rather than on the Israeli court’s ruling.135 The court ultimately ruled that 
comity did not require it to “respect or defer to the acts of a judgment 
creditor.”136 
In reaching these decisions, the courts did not spell out their policy rea-
sons for declining to grant comity with regard to the automatic stay. 
However, when one considers the primary purpose of the automatic 
stay—to “prevent the debtor’s estate from being picked to pieces by 
creditors”137 so that the bankruptcy court can distribute the debtor’s as-
sets in a fair and equitable manner,138—one can readily surmise that ex-
tending comity by disregarding the automatic stay would be contrary to 
the policy of protecting a U.S. debtor and preserving the debtor’s estate 
for the benefit of the creditors. Therefore, since courts should not extend 
comity in instances in which doing so would be contrary to U.S. pol-
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 657. 
 131. In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. at 658. 
 132. Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 766–67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 133. Id. at 770. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Underwood v. Hillard (In re Rimsat), 98 F.3d 965, 961 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Martin-Trigona v. Champion Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 138. GMAM v. Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (In re Globo Comunicacoes 
E Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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icy,139 they should not extend comity to foreign actors when doing so 
would allow the actor to avoid the automatic stay. 
IV. AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISIONS AROUND THE GLOBE: A 
COMPARATIVE EXERCISE ENABLING DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS 
FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A. Automatic Stay Provisions in Foreign Jurisdictions 
The United States is not the only country in the world whose bank-
ruptcy code has adopted an automatic stay provision—far from it. In par-
ticular, many European Union (“EU”)140 countries have incorporated 
automatic stay provisions into their bankruptcy codes.141 Others have 
adopted stay provisions that are not automatic, but are triggered by an 
action or at the discretion of the court or one of the parties.142 Some of 
these provisions are similar to the U.S. automatic stay, while others are 
very different with regard to scope, duration, and severity.143 Before ad-
dressing a solution to a problem, one must understand all aspects of that 
problem. Since international insolvency is a two-way street, understand-
ing how foreign countries treat their bankruptcy proceedings is essential 
to developing an international solution that foreign countries will receive 
favorably. 
1. France 
In order to better enable businesses to restructure while continuing to 
operate, France instituted a new preservation procedure in its Commer-
cial Code.144 Similar to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the 
preservation procedure provides for a restructuring plan to be drawn up 
by the debtor so that the debtor can repay its liabilities and continue to 
                                                                                                             
 139. Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
 140. The European Union consists of twenty-seven member states: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
For more information, see EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/ 
index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2007). 
 141. See CHARLES D. SCHMERLER & JAMES R. SILKENAT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSOLVENCIES AND DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 228, 259, 370, 397 (Charles D. Schmerler ed., 
Oxford University Press 2006) [hereinafter SCHMERLER & SILKENAT]. 
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operate simultaneously.145 According to the Code, the preservation pro-
cedure is available to any debtor who can show that he is in a situation 
that will probably lead to a suspension of payments.146 In order to best 
protect the debtor during his period of restructuring, “the institution of a 
preservation proceeding triggers a stay of proceedings.”147 Specifically, 
the opening of a procedure begins with an “observation period,” during 
which secured creditors are not entitled to enforce their security.148 This 
is similar to U.S. law in that a stay is automatically triggered, but differs 
in that the French stay will not last indefinitely.149 
2. Ireland 
Under Ireland’s Companies Act of 1990, the issuing of a bankruptcy 
petition immediately triggers a “protection period.”150 Under this protec-
tion period, no proceedings can be opened or continued against the 
debtor without permission from the court.151 This protection period be-
gins on the date the petition is filed and lasts for a maximum of one hun-
dred days.152 As with France’s stay provision, Ireland’s is similar to the 
U.S. automatic stay in that other proceedings are stayed automatically 
and immediately, but the stay does not last for the entire length of the 
insolvency proceedings.153 Additionally, it is significant that Ireland’s 
stay provision states that proceedings already in motion cannot be con-
tinued.154 This idea is also found in U.S. law, but it is not prevalent in the 
bankruptcy laws of many other EU countries. 
3. Italy 
Italian bankruptcy proceedings are similar to U.S. Chapter 7 actions in 
that they are aimed at liquidating the debtor’s assets and paying off credi-
tors on a priority basis.155 One of the main effects of an Italian bank-
ruptcy petition is a “stay of enforcement proceedings,” under which 
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“creditors are not entitled to start or continue any enforcement proceed-
ings over the assets of the company.”156 Like U.S. and Irish law, the Ital-
ian stay is also automatic and covers actions already in motion.157 
4. The Netherlands 
The stay provision in the Netherlands is much less stringent than are 
stay provisions of most other countries. Primarily, a stay will not auto-
matically go into effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition; rather, a 
stay will only be entered at the request of the receiver or an interested 
party.158 Secondly, if the court does issue a stay order, the order will only 
last for a maximum of two months, with one possible two-month exten-
sion.159 Lastly, the stay order will not completely bar creditors from act-
ing against the debtor; instead, it will prevent third parties from taking 
“recourse against any asset falling within the bankruptcy estate” or 
“claim any assets which are in control of the debtor or the receiver” 
without permission from the court.160 Unlike the other stays that have 
been discussed thus far, this stay still enables creditors to act against the 
debtor—just not without court permission. 
5. Spain 
Spain’s stay provision, like some others discussed above, operates 
much more as a “waiting period” than an actual stay of proceedings.161 
Specifically, once a bankruptcy petition is filed, secured creditors are 
prevented from enforcing their security until the earlier of one of two 
dates: the date when the debtor allows secured creditors to act, or the 
date one year from when the petition was filed if liquidation has not yet 
begun.162 The purpose of this waiting period, just as we have seen in 
other jurisdictions, is to “protect the viability of the debtor’s business” 
while the insolvency proceedings are underway.163 However, it is impor-
tant to note that this waiting period only applies if the assets in question 
relate to the “debtor’s ordinary business.” If they do not, secured credi-
tors can institute enforcement proceedings at any time.164 This is a direct 
contrast with U.S. law, under which an estate comprised of all the 
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debtor’s assets is created, and creditors are stayed from acting against 
any asset in the estate.165 
6. The United Kingdom 
Once an insolvency administration begins in the United Kingdom, a 
statutory moratorium goes into effect.166 This moratorium, like many 
other stay provisions discussed above, has the effect of preventing credi-
tors from reaching the debtor’s assets for the duration of the morato-
rium.167 Specifically, the moratorium mandates that creditors may not 
take any steps towards enforcing any security held by the debtor.168 As 
with the U.S. automatic stay, the U.K. moratorium remains in effect for 
as long as the debtor remains in its bankruptcy administration.169 
B. U.S. Case Law Dealing with Foreign Automatic Stay Provisions 
Given the fact that many countries other than the United States have 
stay provisions—some automatic—in their bankruptcy codes, an obvious 
question arises: if foreign states claim extraterritorial application of their 
stay provisions, will and should U.S. courts respect those claims of extra-
territorial reach? This question has been answered affirmatively by In re 
Artimm170 and In re Rosacometta.171 
Both Artimm and Rosacometta delt with the extraterritorial application 
of the Italian automatic stay.172 In both cases, bankruptcy proceedings 
were already underway in Italy, and the Italian trustee for the debtor 
brought an ancillary case in the United States under § 304 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code173 in order to prevent U.S. creditors from acting on as-
sets that the debtor possessed in the United States.174 The Artimm court 
began its discussion of the Italian automatic stay by citing that stay pro-
vision and finding that Italian law maintains that the Italian automatic 
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stay applies extraterritorially.175 The court then went on to discuss the 
applicable EU law and found that under that law, the Italian automatic 
stay would apply throughout the European Union.176 The court reasoned 
that the EU law supported the determination that the Italian automatic 
stay should apply extraterritorially, and also added that 
[i]t is particularly appropriate that a United States Bankruptcy court 
recognize the extraterritorial reach of the Italian automatic stay [be-
cause] . . . the United States cannot expect that foreign courts will rec-
ognize the extraterritorial reach of its own automatic stay . . . if its 
courts do not equally recognize the impact in the United States of a for-
eign automatic stay.177 
In In re Rosacometta, decided three years after In re Artimm, the court 
relied heavily upon the Artimm decision in order to arrive at the same 
conclusion.178 This cooperative attitude within the realm of international 
insolvencies is essential in order to handle these insolvencies in our in-
creasingly global marketplace.179 
V. WORKING TOWARDS SOLUTIONS: EC REGULATION 1346/2000 AND 
UNCITRAL’S MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 
Having already recognized this problem, various international bodies 
within our global community have begun proposing legislation to facili-
tate extraterritorially-applicable automatic stay provisions. Two legisla-
tive acts that have already been implemented could provide viable solu-
tions: the European Union’s EC Regulation 1346/2000 and 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 
A. EC Regulation 1346/2000 
On May 29, 2000, the European Union passed Council Regulation No. 
1346/2000 (“EC Regulation”).180 The European Union realized that 
cross-border insolvencies were becoming more and more prevalent in the 
increasingly global market, and it therefore took measures to promote 
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efficient operation of international insolvencies.181 Under this regulation, 
there are two kinds of insolvency proceedings that can be opened: main 
proceedings and secondary proceedings.182 Main proceedings can only be 
opened in the member state in which a debtor has the center of his inter-
ests, and secondary proceedings can be opened in any other member state 
in which “the debtor has an establishment.”183 While secondary proceed-
ings may run parallel to main proceedings, a secondary proceeding can 
only affect the assets located in the member state in which it is opened.184 
In order to maintain stability among the various proceedings, the court 
which has jurisdiction over a main proceeding is able to “order provi-
sional and protective measures from the time of the request to open pro-
ceedings.”185 This ability includes the power to order protective measures 
as to assets belonging to the debtor that are located in another member 
state.186 The regulation has clearly stated the purpose and import of these 
provisions: “to guarantee the effectiveness of the insolvency proceed-
ings.”187 
Perhaps the most important section of the EC Regulation is Article 4: 
Law Applicable. This section sets forth provisions describing which 
member state’s laws predominate in situations in which the laws of mul-
tiple member states conflict with one another.188 Specifically, this article 
grants power to the member state in which a main proceeding is open to 
determine which assets make up the debtor’s estate and “the effects of 
the insolvency proceedings on proceedings brought by individual credi-
tors.”189 The effect of this article is that if the member state in which the 
main proceeding is taking place has a stay provision (automatic or oth-
erwise), that stay applies in every other member state. The only excep-
tion to this rule is with regard to lawsuits already pending.190 Under Arti-
cle 15 of the EC Regulation, if a lawsuit is pending in one state and a 
main proceeding opens in another, the law of the first state shall apply 
with regard to the pending proceeding.191 
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B. UNCITRAL 
In 1997, UNCITRAL adopted its Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency (“Model Law”).192 In adopting this Model Law, UNCITRAL, in 
keeping with its “mandate to further the progressive harmonization and 
unification of the law of international trade,”193 sought to “provide effec-
tive mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency.”194 
Specifically, the Model Law is designed to encourage cooperation among 
bankruptcy courts from different countries, promote “fair and efficient 
administration” of international insolvencies, and maximize the value of 
the debtor’s assets for the benefit of all interested parties.195 
According to Article 1, the Model Law should apply in two situations: 
when a foreign court or representative is seeking the assistance of the 
state which has enacted the law, or when the state which has enacted the 
law is seeking assistance in a foreign state.196 The Model Law, like the 
EC Regulation, is based on the premise that there are two kinds of for-
eign proceedings: foreign main proceedings and foreign non-main pro-
ceedings.197 These definitions are virtually the same as those provided by 
the EC Regulation: a foreign main proceeding is a proceeding in a for-
eign state in which the debtor has the “centre of its main interests,”198 
whereas a foreign non-main proceeding is a proceeding (aside from the 
main proceeding) in a state in which “the debtor has an establishment.”199 
The crux of UNCITRAL’s Model Law, as relevant to international 
automatic stay enforcement, is that the Law allows a representative of a 
foreign main proceeding to apply for recognition within a state that has 
adopted the Model Law.200 Most importantly, once a State operating un-
der the Model Law recognizes a foreign main proceeding, an automatic 
stay goes into effect and prohibits the commencement or continuation of 
actions against the debtor, as well as any other act of “execution against 
the debtor’s assets.”201 This idea seems to be at the heart of what the 
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United States is looking for in claiming extraterritorial application of its 
automatic stay. However, it is crucial to note than an important exception 
exists in Article 6 of the Model Law which allows a country to decline to 
recognize a foreign proceeding or afford it rights regarding a stay if do-
ing so would be contrary to the policy considerations of that country.202 
VI. AN ANSWER FOR THE UNITED STATES? 
A. The Adoption of UNCITRAL’s Model Law: 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1527 
It seems obvious that the United States views UNCITRAL’s Model 
Law as a step in the right direction based on the recent addition of Chap-
ter 15 to the United States Bankruptcy Code.203 This chapter, entitled 
“Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases,”204 is directly based on 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law.205 Like the Model Law, the purpose of Chap-
ter 15 is to “provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of 
cross-border insolvency.”206 Chapter 15 applies in four situations: 1) 
when a foreign court or representative seeks assistance in the United 
States in connection to a foreign insolvency; 2) when a foreign court or 
representative seeks assistance in connection with a case proceeding un-
der U.S. bankruptcy law; 3) when foreign and domestic bankruptcy cases 
concerning the same debtor are proceeding concurrently; or 4) when in-
terested parties in a foreign country have some interest in participating in 
or requesting the commencement of a case under Chapter 15.207 There 
are also several exceptions set out in section 1501(c),208 but the bottom 
line is that “a foreign corporation that is not a railroad or a banking insti-
tution and that has a residence, domicile, place of business, or property in 
the United States can obtain relief under Chapter 15.”209 
As is the case with UNCTIRAL’s Model Law, Chapter 15 operates 
largely on the premise that foreign proceedings must be classified either 
as foreign main proceedings or as foreign non-main proceedings.210 The 
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definitions of foreign main proceeding and foreign non-main proceeding 
are the same under Chapter 15 as they are under UNCITRAL’s Model 
Law.211 Additionally, the stay provisions in Chapter 15 operate just as 
their counterparts do in the Model Law: under § 1519, a foreign repre-
sentative can request a stay once a petition for recognition is filed,212 and 
under § 1520, an automatic stay goes into effect as soon as recognition of 
a foreign main proceeding is granted.213 This automatic stay “applies 
immediately with respect to the debtor and all property of the debtor that 
is located within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.214 
However, looking to the Model Law and Chapter 15 to ensure extrater-
ritorial recognition of the U.S. automatic stay presents several major 
problems. Primarily, only twelve countries in addition to the United 
States have adopted the Model Law at this point in time.215 With only 
twelve other countries signed on, proceedings against a U.S. debtor will 
only be stayed to any degree of certainty (assuming the U.S. proceeding 
is recognized as a foreign main proceeding) in those twelve countries. 
Moreover, there is nothing stopping even those countries that have 
adopted the Model Law from failing to grant a stay if doing so would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country.216 Since foreign countries 
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have vastly different insolvency codes and foreign and domestic value 
systems than does the United States, it seems evident that the “catch-all” 
policy exception will create inconsistency in the application of the Model 
Law from country to country. Because of this exception, the United 
States would be in essentially the same position it is now: it would need 
to rely on the discretion of foreign courts in order to attain extraterritorial 
recognition of its automatic stay. Since that is the unfavorable situation 
the United States is seeking to avoid, relying on UNCITRAL’s Model 
Law—though a step in the right direction—is an inadequate solution. 
B. Looking Further: A Convention is the Key 
Another possible solution is for the United States to seek a treaty or 
convention resembling the EC Regulation discussed above.217 If the 
United States became a party to such a treaty, its ultimate goal would be 
achieved: the § 362 automatic stay would apply within the boundaries of 
all other signing countries provided that the U.S. proceeding is the main 
proceeding in any given case.218 While this approach also requires action 
on the part of foreign countries in that those countries would have to sign 
the convention, the United States would be taking an active role in solic-
iting signatures rather than the passive role of waiting for the rest of the 
world to adopt UNCITRAL’s Model Law. Furthermore, it seems plausi-
ble that other countries would be amenable to such a convention given 
that the EC Regulation already exists, and various countries—as evi-
denced by the growing popularity of the UNCITRAL’s Model Law—are 
now thinking more carefully about how to best handle cross-border in-
solvencies in our global marketplace. 
However, this solution too is imperfect. The § 362 automatic stay is far 
more sweeping and inclusive than the stay provisions of many other 
countries, including most of the EU countries discussed above.219 There-
fore, it seems plausible that other countries with less-inclusive stay pro-
visions may not want the United States as a member to such a treaty for 
fear of having a very broad stay provision thrust upon them should a 
main proceeding open in the United States. Additionally, the EC Regula-
tion has an important exception for suits already pending: if a main pro-
ceeding were to open in the United States with a non-main proceeding 
already pending in another signing country, the laws of that other country 
would determine whether the pending proceedings should be stayed.220 
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This notion is contrary to the § 362 automatic stay.221 If the United States 
were to pursue an international convention to ensure extraterritorial rec-
ognition of its automatic stay, it would most likely have to be willing to 
compromise the rigidity and inclusiveness of § 362 so as to make the 
convention appealing to potential signers. However, even with these 
drawbacks, pursuing such a convention seems like a favorable option in 
order to ensure that U.S. debtors are protected when their insolvency 
proceedings reach beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
The automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is an essential component of 
the U.S. insolvency process. The automatic stay mandates that once a 
debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States, no creditor 
may initiate or continue any proceedings against that debtor or otherwise 
make a claim to any of the debtor’s property.222 In order to best protect 
debtors and creditors in our expanding global marketplace, U.S. courts 
have continually held that the automatic stay applies even to foreign 
creditors and to property located outside the territorial boundaries of the 
United States.223 However, this holding creates problems in situations in 
which either a foreign creditor seizes a U.S. debtor’s assets such that a 
U.S. court cannot impose sanctions upon the creditor, or a foreign court 
refuses to recognize that property within its own territorial jurisdiction is 
subject to the control of U.S. courts.224 In short, the extraterritorial reach 
of the automatic stay operates well in theory but can falter in its practical 
application. 
Although there is no clear or perfect answer to this problem, several in-
ternational bodies have adopted policies that could serve as a solution. 
One possibility is UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency.225 Relying on the Model Law seems like an attractive prospect 
because Article 20 states that once a state operating under the Model 
Law recognizes a foreign main proceeding, an automatic stay goes into 
effect that prohibits the commencement or continuation of actions 
against the debtor or any other act of “execution against the debtor’s as-
sets.”226 However, the Model Law’s effectiveness in protecting the extra-
territorial application of the U.S. automatic stay is wholly dependent on 
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other countries opting to adopt the Model law; thus far, only twelve other 
countries have done so.227 Furthermore, even if every other country in the 
world were to adopt the Model Law, it contains a catch-all provision ena-
bling a country to decline to recognize a foreign proceeding or stay pro-
vision if doing so would be contrary to the policy considerations of that 
country.228 
A more attractive prospective solution is for the United States to seek a 
treaty or convention resembling EC Regulation 1346/2000.229 Under the 
EC Regulation, once a given proceeding is categorized as a main pro-
ceeding, the automatic stay of the country in which the main proceeding 
is pending applies in all other member states.230 Under such a conven-
tion, if a main proceeding is pending in the United States, the § 362 
automatic stay would apply in all other signing countries. There is an 
exception in the EC Regulation to this rule that excludes suits already 
pending,231 but this may be a small price for the United States to pay in 
order to ensure extraterritorial recognition of its automatic stay in the 
vast majority of situations. 
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